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2, 9

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

ISMAIL ABDULLAHI MOHAMED,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20110066-CA
Appellant is incarcerated.

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Appellant Ismail Abdullahi Mohamed appeals from a Sentence, Judgment,
Commitment for a conviction of Distribution of or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled
Substance, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii)
(2008); in the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Deno Himonas, presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)0) (2008). See Addendum A (Sentence, Judgment,
Commitment)
ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION
Issue I: Whether there was insufficient evidence presented by the State to support
a conviction for Distribution of or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance.
Standard of Review: When considering a sufficiency of evidence claim, this Court
will "review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in
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the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury." State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ^ 15,
63 P.3d 94. It "will reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when the
evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he
was convicted." Id. (citing State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)).
Notwithstanding the presumptions in favor of the jury's decision this Court
still has the right to review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
verdict. The fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover the gap
between the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In fulfillment
of its duty to review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably
be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict, the reviewing
court will stretch the evidentiary fabric as far as it will go. But this does not
mean that the court can take a speculative leap across a remaining gap in
order to sustain a verdict.
Id. (quoting Petree, 659 P.2d at 444-45).
Preservation: Mr. Mohamed preserved this issue by making a motion for a
directed verdict. R. 130: 119-20; see State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 11, 14, 10 P.3d
346 ("As a general rule, to ensure that the trial court addresses the sufficiency of the
evidence, a defendant must request that the court do so."). Although Mr. Mohamed
preserved this issue, if this Court finds preservation inadequate, it can be reviewed under
the plain error doctrine. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74,ffif12-15.
STATUTORY PROVISION
The following statutory provision is determinative of the issue on appeal.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2008) - Distribution of or Arranging to Distribute a
Controlled Substance:
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
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(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally: . . .
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(4) Prohibited acts D -- Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under
this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58,
Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to
the penalties and classifications under this Subsection (4) if the trier of fact finds
the act is committed: . . .
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater,
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; . . .
(ix) within any area that is within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility,
or grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i), (ii), (iv), (vi), and (vii).1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
An Information was filed March 23, 2010, charging Mr. Mohamed with
Distribution of or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance, a first degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (2008). R. 1-2. A preliminary hearing
was held April 20, 2010 binding Mr. Mohamed over on the charged offense. R. 15.
A jury trial was held on September 29, 2010. R. 130. After the State presented its
evidence, Mr. Mohamed made a motion for a directed verdict, which was denied. R. 130:
119-120. The jury returned a guilty verdict on the charged offense. R.44-45; 130: 173175. Mr. Mohamed requested the trial court to give him credit for the nine months he
served, and allow him to be admitted to inpatient treatment as part of his sentence. R.

1

The jury found that the alleged transaction took place in or within 1000 feet of such an
area described in the statute. R. 44. Mr. Mohamed does not contest the location of the
alleged transaction.
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131: 3-4. The trial court denied both of these requests and sentenced Mr. Mohamed to the
indeterminate term of five years to life at the state prison. R. 131:4.
Mr. Mohamed filed a timely appeal. R. 122-23.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the evening of March 18, 2010, Detective Parisot and Detective Johnson were
working undercover in the area of 200 South, between West Temple and 600 West,
looking for individuals involved in drug dealing. R. 130: 57-58. The detectives saw Mr.
Mohamed outside of the Salt Lake City homeless shelter on 200 South and approached
him. R. 130: 60.
Mr. Mohamed is a Somali immigrant and English is not his first language. A
certified Somali interpreter was used to allow Mr. Mohamed to understand what was said
during the trial process. R. 130:14-15, 21. Detective Parisot testified that Mr. Mohamed
conducted all of his communications with the detectives in English and when asked
whether the Mr. Mohamed could understand what the detectives were saying to him,
Detective Parisot stated "[w]e were able to carry on a conversation." Id. at 85.
Detective Parisot said to Mr. Mohamed, "Hey, you got some work?" Id. at 61. Mr.
Mohamed responded that he did not have any, but that he would help them find some. Id.
Detective Parisot acknowledged that most people in the homeless shelter were
unemployed and looking for work, however he maintained that Mr. Mohamed "was
telling [the detectives that] he didn't have any cocaine, but [that] he would help [them]
locate some cocaine." Id. at 61, 82. Detective Parisot did not use any other phrase to
request the purchase of drugs, and he did not use the word cocaine or any common code
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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words such as "powder, rock, crack [or] white." Id. at 81, 56. While the detective did not
use any of these words with Mr. Mohamed, he testified that undercover agents generally
use these words in "an effort to .. . fit in [and] act like [they] belong" when working
undercover. Id. at 56.
Following this conversation, the three men set off together, walking east along 200
South, towards the post office, because Mr. Mohamed had said "that's where a lot of the
guys are" and they could probably "find some" there. Id. at 61-62, 83. Along the way,
Mr. Mohamed approached several people and asked in English, "Hey, do you have some?
Do you have some work?" Id. at 62. Not receiving an affirmative response, and finding
no one at the post office, the three men set off again, this time heading west. Id. at 62-63.
Upon reaching the Jackson Apartments on the corner of 300 West and 200 South,
the detectives noticed that they were being followed by a "passive" male individual. Id. at
63-64. He was Caucasian and spoke English. Id. at 84. This individual approached some
men sitting outside the apartment building and solicited them for crack cocaine. Id. at 64,
84. He appeared to be soliciting on his own behalf. Id. at 84-85. Detective Parisot
testified that after the stranger's solicitation for crack, the men outside the apartment
invited them all up to one of their apartments to buy crack. Id. at 64. The detectives
refused, stating they were afraid of being robbed inside the apartment, to which Mr.
Mohamed agreed that the men would likely rob them. Id. Mr. Mohamed and the
detectives then continued walking west. Id.
The detectives and Mr. Mohamed then encountered a man, later identified as
Mohamed Osmond, 20 to 30 feet north of the corner of 200 South and Rio Grande Street.
5 Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Id. at 64-65. Detective Parisot testified that Mr. Mohamed approached Mr. Osmond and
the two spoke in a language that Detective Parisot couldn't understand. Id. at 65-66.
Following this conversation, which lasted about 5 to 10 seconds, Mr. Osmond turned to
Detective Parisot and asked him in English, "How much?" Id. at 66. The detective
responded "20" and when he pulled out a $20 bill, Mr. Osmond spit a bag out of his
mouth and handed it to the detective. Id. at 66-67. This bag was later found to contain
0.15 grams of crack cocaine. Id. at 88. Although the detective did not see Mr. Mohamed's
facial expressions at the time, Mr. Mohamed said nothing while the transaction took
place. Id. at 68-69.
Following the transaction, Mr. Osmond quickly exited the area and the police were
unable to arrest him until an hour later, when they found him again in the vicinity of the
homeless shelter. Id. at 86, 70-71. However, Mr. Mohamed remained with the detectives
as they left the corner of 200 South and Rio Grande Street and walked with them until the
police responded to the "bust signal" and arrested him. Id. at 69-70, 86. Detective Parisot
speculated that Mr. Mohamed stayed with the officers because he was expecting a
"bump," or a broken-off piece of the crack cocaine in return for his helping the detectives
obtain drugs. Id. at 86-87. The detective claimed that no special tools, such as a knife, are
needed to break off a piece of the drug. Id. at 89-90. Detective Parisot did not record this
suspicion that Mr. Mohamed followed him because he wanted a "bump" in his police
report from that night. Id. at 90.
Detective Parisot further testified that a small amount of crack cocaine, such as the
one purchased from Mr. Osmond, is usually smoked in a glass pipe. Id. at 91-92. Mr.
6
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Mohamed did not indicate to the detective that he had such a pipe nor was he found to
have possessed any drug paraphernalia of this kind. Id. at 94. Mr. Mohamed was
therefore not charged with possession of drug paraphernalia. Id. at 94.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse Mr. Mohamed's conviction where the marshaled
evidence establishes the State failed to meet its burden. The evidence presented failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Mohamed knowingly and intentionally
arranged to distribute crack cocaine. Furthermore, the insufficiency of the evidence
constituted plain error, which should have been obvious to the trial court, the absence of
which was reasonably likely to produce a more favorable outcome for Mr. Mohamed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE WHERE THE MARSHALED
EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT THAT MR. MOHAMED WAS GUILTY OF THE CHARGED
OFFENSE.
This Court will "reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when55 it concludes
"as a matter of law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant conviction.55 State v.
Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, f 10, 2 P.3d 954 (quotation omitted). It will "view the
evidence in a light most favorable to the jury verdict,55 and "will reverse only if the
evidence is so inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime.55 Id. (quotations
omitted). Though the burden of establishing insufficiency of the evidence "is high, it is
not impossible.55 Id. (citation omitted). This Court "will not make speculative leaps across
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gaps in the evidence." Id. (citation omitted). "Every element of the crime charged must
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (citation omitted). In other words, "[t]o affirm
the jury's verdict," this Court "must be sure the State has introduced evidence sufficient
to support all elements of the charged crime." Id. (citation omitted); see also Holgate,
2000 UT 74,1| 18; State v. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, f 17, 993 P.2d 232.
When making an insufficient evidence claim, the defendant "must marshal the
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, f 13,
25 P.3d 985 (citations omitted). Proper marshaling requires the appellant to present "in
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial
which supports the very findings the appellant resists." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv.
Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis in original); see also State v.
Maese, 2010 UT App 106,ffif16-17, 236 P.3d 155. "After constructing this magnificent
array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence."
Majestic Inv. Co, 818 P.2d at 1315; see also Kimball v. Kimball 2009 UT App 233, \ 20
n.5,217P.3d733.
As it reviews the marshaled evidence, this Court will "not sit as a second trier of
fact." Boyd, 2001 UT 30, <|[ 16. Thus, "[s]o long as there is some evidence, including
reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can
reasonably be made, [this Court's] inquiry stops." Id. Instead, this Court will simply
"assume that the jury believed the evidence supporting the verdict." Id. (quotations and
citation omitted); see State v. Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, \ 30, 989 P.2d 1091 ("We may
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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not weigh evidence or assess witness credibility, but instead 'assume that the jury
believed the evidence and inferences that support the verdict.'") (citation omitted).
As demonstrated below, the marshaled evidence is insufficient to show Mr.
Mohammed met the statutory requirements for the crime of distributing or arranging to
distribute a controlled substance. Additionally, and in the alternative, this lack of
evidence constitutes plain error.
A. The Marshaled Evidence Supporting the Verdict
Under Utah law distribution or arrangement to distribute a controlled substance is defined
in part as follows:
(1) Prohibited acts A—Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally: . . .
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance.
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(1) (2008). "To make out a prima facie case under the statute,
the State must show that an offer, agreement, consent, or arrangement to distribute
controlled substances was made by the defendant and, whichever variation or variations it
charges, that the behavior was 'engaged in knowingly or with intent that such distribution
would, or would be likely to, occur.'5' State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, ^ 9, 3 P.3d 725
{abrogated on other grounds by State v. Morales-Torres, 2001 UT App 246, 2001 WL
911418), citing State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah 1979); see also State v.
Gallegos, 851 P.2d 1185, 1190 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). "[I]f he intends the distribution for
sale of a controlled substance, any act in furtherance of an arrangement therefor
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constitutes the criminal offense described by the statute." Harrison, 601 P.2d at 924;
State v. Gray, 111 P.2d 1313, 1320-21 (Utah 1986).
Here, the marshaled evidence was "so inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt" that Mr. Mohamed intended
to arrange the distribution of a controlled substance. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, \ 10
(quotation omitted). Detective Parisot testified that he and another undercover officer
approached Mr. Mohamed near a homeless shelter and asked "you got some work?" R.
130:60-61. Mr. Mohamed responded that he did not have any but that he would help the
detectives find some. Id. at 61. The detective assumed this meant that Mr. Mohammed
"didn't have any cocaine, but [that] he would help [the detectives] locate some cocaine."
Id
Mr. Mohamed walked with the detectives towards the post office because Mr.
Mohamed said they could probably "find some" there since "that's where a lot of the
guys are." Id. at 83, 62. On the way, Mr. Mohamed approached several individuals and
asked them in English, "Do you have some? Do you have some work?" Id. at 62. After
having no success, and seeing that there was no one at the post office, they turned around
and headed west. Id. at 62-63. The three men then walked past the Jackson Apartments
where an unknown individual solicited crack cocaine from some men standing outside
the building. Id. at 63-64. These residents of the apartment invited the unknown
individual and the three men up to purchase crack cocaine. Id. at 64. The detective turned
down the offer, explaining that he was afraid of being robbed, and Mr. Mohamed agreed
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with the detective stating, "[d]on't go in there, I think they're planning on robbing you."
Id.
After walking further west, Mr. Mohamed approached Mr. Osmond off the corner
of 200 South and Rio Grande Street and spoke to him in a foreign language. Id. at 64-65.
The conversation lasted between 5 and 10 seconds, after which Mr. Osmond immediately
turned to Detective Parisot and said "How much?" Id. at 66. The detective told him "20,"
Mr. Osmond spit out a bag from his mouth into his hand and traded it for the detective's
$20 bill. Id. The detective testified that Mr. Mohamed said nothing while the transaction
took place. Id. at 68-69. The bag was later determined to contain 0.15 grams of crack
cocaine. Id. at 88.
Mr. Mohamed remained "right with" the detectives as they left the scene of the
transaction until he was arrested. Id. at 69. The officers speculated that this was because
Mr. Mohamed wanted a piece of the cocaine as payment for helping them find a seller.
Id. at 87.
B. The Evidence Presented Was Not Sufficient To Show That Mr. Mohamed
Distributed or Arranged To Distribute A Controlled Substance.
In order for the State to sustain a conviction for a first degree felony it had to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Mohamed knowingly or intentionally
committed some "act in furtherance of an arrangement" to distribute a controlled
substance. Harrison, 601 P.2d at 924. The marshaled evidence, however, was so
"inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
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reasonable doubt" that Mr. Mohamed knowingly or intentionally arranged for the
distribution of a controlled substance. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, ^j 10.
The evidence is insufficient to prove that Mr. Mohamed had the requisite
knowledge or intent because it requires a "speculative leap[] across [a] gap[] in the
evidence," Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, «([ 10, that is too great to constitute a mere
"reasonable inference[]," Boyd, 2001 UT 30, ^ 16. This is because there is no evidence
that Mr. Mohamed ever actually understood the code word for cocaine. In fact, the
evidence tends to show that Mr. Mohamed understood the word "work" to mean
employment. Detective Parisot acknowledged that he approached Mr. Mohamed outside
of the homeless shelter, a place likely to draw people looking for work. R. 130: 82. The
detective also acknowledged that he had no basis for his belief that Mr. Mohamed
understood the question "you got some work" to be a solicitation for cocaine instead of
employment. Id. He merely stated that he relied on his training and experience in making
that assumption. Id. The detective further testified that he never used any other phrase to
ask Mr. Mohamed for cocaine. Id. at 81. Additionally, the detective never heard Mr.
Mohamed use words other than "work" to describe the object of their search. Id. at 62.
Mr. Mohamed spoke to Mr. Osmond before the transaction in a different language, and
there is no evidence of what was said, let alone whether it involved cocaine. Id. at 65-66.
Thus, there is no indication from the evidence that Mr. Mohamed understood the secret
meaning of the word "work;" instead the State required the jury to make a "speculative
leap[]" over that gap. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, 1j 10.
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Moreover, reasonable minds would have entertained a reasonable doubt about Mr.
Mohamed's understanding of the code word "work." English is not Mr. Mohamed5 s first
language. In fact, during his trial he required a translator, and the trial could not start until
the translator arrived. R.130: 14-15, 21. Although Detective Parisot testified that he was
"able to carry on a conversation" with Mr. Mohamed in English, an apparent
conversational ability does not support the conclusion that Mr. Mohamed understood the
covert meaning for an English code word. Id. at 85. In fact, Mr. Mohamed only parroted
back the detective's words "you got some work" that night, and never used any word
other than "work." Id. at 62, 83-84. Considering these facts, the assumption that Mr.
Mohamed knew "work" meant cocaine is so inherently improbable that reasonable minds
would have had reasonable doubts about its accuracy.
The evidence presented by the State supporting the arranging to distribute a
controlled substance charge was so "inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that [Mr. Mohamed]
committed the crime." Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, ^f 10 (quotation omitted). The State
failed to prove all the elements of the statute beyond a reasonable doubt, because it failed
to show that Mr. Mohamed understood "work" to mean cocaine, and therefore, that he
formed the requisite knowledge or intent to arrange a drug transaction. See Hester, 2000
UT App 159, Tj 9. Therefore, Mr. Mohamed's conviction for arranging to distribute a
controlled substance should be reversed.
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C. In the Alternative, Mr. Mohamed's Conviction Should Be Overturned for Plain
Error.
It was plain error to allow Mr. Mohamed's conviction on obviously insufficient
evidence. The plain error doctrine can serve as an alternative to an insufficiency of the
evidence claim when the claim is not preserved at trial. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, \ 11. It
"enables the appellate court to balance the need for procedural regularity with the
demands of fairness" and "to avoid injustice." Id. \ 13 (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that (i) an error
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the
error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our
confidence in the verdict is undermined.
Id. (citation and quotation omitted).
First, Mr. Mohamed's conviction was based on insufficient evidence, as argued
above, which constitutes error. Id. <fl 17. Second, this error was "so obvious and
fundamental that it was plain error to submit the case to the jury." Id. Tf 18. "To establish
that the error should have been obvious to the trial court, [the defendant] must show that
the law governing the error was clear at the time the alleged error was made." State v.
Dean, 2004 UT 63, \ 16, 95 P.3d 276. Here, the case law was well settled that the State
can prove intent through circumstantial evidence, as long as there was "sufficient
evidence, including . . . inferences that could be drawn therefrom," that the defendant
possessed the requisite intent. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^} 21-22. Such inferences must
"have a basis in logic and reasonable human experience."

Id.^2\.
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The State provided the following circumstantial evidence towards intent to arrange
a drug transaction: Mr. Mohamed was approached by undercover detectives outside a
homeless shelter and asked if he had some work. R. 130: 60-61. Mr. Mohamed replied
that he did not but that he would help the detectives find some. Id. at 61. Mr. Mohamed
requested "work" from others in the area, but with no success. Id. at 62. Mr. Mohamed
approached Mr. Osmond and spoke to him in a foreign language, after which Mr.
Osmond initiated a drug transaction with the detective. Id. at 66. This evidence, by itself,
was insufficient to prove the requisite intent.
The State's evidence required the inference that Mr. Mohamed understood the
term "work" to mean cocaine, and, as a corollary, that he conveyed that understanding to
Mr. Osmond in another language. Given the evidence, this inference is contrary to "logic
and reasonable human experience." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 21. As explained above,
nowhere did Mr. Mohamed's words or behavior that night indicate that he knew the
secret meaning of the word "work" was really cocaine. Furthermore, Mr. Mohamed's
first language is not English and he required a translator at trial, making his
understanding of English code words even more suspect. In addition, the State did not
present any translation of what Mr. Mohamed said to Mr. Osmond. The fact that Mr.
Osmond proceeded to conduct a transaction for crack cocaine does not prove that Mr.
Mohamed understood the term "work" to mean cocaine. Given Mr. Mohamed's limited
English skills and his prior behavior that night, logic and human experience would dictate
that he continued referring to employment when he spoke with Mr. Osmond, and Mr.
Osmond made the connection with cocaine on his own. For these reasons, it should have
15Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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been obvious to the trial court that the inferences drawn by the State's insufficient
evidence lacked a basis in logic and human experience necessary to prove Mr.
Mohamed's intent.
Lastly, the error was harmful and "of such a magnitude that there is reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for [Mr. Mohamed]." State v. Evans, 2001 UT
22, Tf 16, 20 P.3d 888. An error is harmful if it is prejudicial, and the error is prejudicial if
but for the trial court's allowance of insufficient evidence, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. See Dean, 2004 UT 63, Tf 22. Clearly, but for the trial court's
allowance of insufficient evidence by the State, the result of the proceeding would have
been very different for Mr. Mohamed. Had the trial court recognized this error, it would
have "forthwith order[ed the defendant] discharged." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, % 15. For
these reasons, the court committed plain error with regard to the insufficiency of the
evidence against Mr. Mohamed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Mohamed respectfully requests that this Court
reverse his convictions for distributing or arranging to distribute a controlled substance.
SUBMITTED this 7 ^ _ day of

t5frp^

~

'

, 2011.

^

^ ) E B R A M. NELSON
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.
ISMAIL ABDULLAHI MOHAMED,
Defendant.

Case No: 101902145 FS
Judge:
DENO HIMONAS
Date:
December 10, 2010

PRESENT
Clerk:
kristenl
Prosecutor: PLATT, CHAD L
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): TAN, PATRICK S
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: January 1, 1974
Audio
Tape Number:
S44
Tape Count: 11:08
CHARGES
1. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE DISTRIBUTION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANC 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 09/29/2010 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE
DISTRIBUTION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANC a 1st Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than
five years and which may be life in the Utah State Prison.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.

Defendant transported from the Utah State Prison.^^ois^li
interpreter is present.
^^A)TA/-y
Date:
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DENO HIMON
District Cd
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